Abstract. The requirements specifications of complex systems are increasingly developed in a distributed fashion. It makes inconsistency management necessary during the requirements stage. However, identifying appropriate inconsistency handling proposals is still an important challenge. In particular, for inconsistencies involving many different stakeholders with different concerns, it is difficult to reach an agreement on inconsistency handling. To address this, this paper presents a votebased approach to choosing acceptable common proposals for handling inconsistency. This approach focuses on the inconsistency in requirements that results from conflicting intentions of stakeholders. Informally speaking, we consider each distinct stakeholder (or a distributed artifact) involved in the inconsistency as a voter. Then we transform identification of an acceptable common proposal into a problem of combinatorial vote. Based on each stakeholder's preferences on the set of proposals, an acceptable common proposal is identified in an automated way according to a given social vote rule.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that inconsistency management is one of the important issues in requirements engineering. For any complex software system, the development of requirements typically involves many different stakeholders with different concerns. Then the requirements specifications are increasingly developed in a distributed fashion, Viewpoints-based approaches [1] [2] [3] being a notable example. It makes inconsistency management necessary during the requirements stage. Generally speaking, inconsistency management may be divided into two parts, i.e. consistency checking and inconsistency handling. Consistency checking is a pervasive issue in requirements validation and verification. It focuses on techniques for detecting inconsistencies in a collection of requirements, including logic-based approaches [4] [5] [6] and consistency rule-based approaches [7, 8] . In contrast, inconsistency handling focuses on how to identify an appropriate proposal for handling given inconsistencies and to evaluate the impact it has on other aspects of requirements stage [7, 8] .
Identifying appropriate inconsistency handling actions is still a difficult, but important challenge [5] . Generally, the choice of an inconsistency-handling action should depend on the nature and context of these inconsistencies [9, 10] . But the context of the inconsistencies in requirements is always rather complex. Many factors such as misunderstanding between customers and analysts, inappropriate statements of requirements, and conflicting intentions of stakeholders can cause inconsistencies during requirements stage. It is not easy to provide a universal methodology to handle all the inconsistencies in requirements engineering.
In this paper, we concentrate on a particular kind of inconsistency that results from conflicting intentions of stakedholers. We would assume that there is no shortcoming in the ways that developers elicit and restate the requirements. That is, the inconsistent requirements are correctly elicited, stated, and represented from the perspective of corresponding stakeholders. There is no cause other than conflicting intentions of different stakeholders for the inconsistency. When an inconsistency resulting from conflicting intentions of stakeholders are detected, the different stakeholders involved in the inconsistency often present different proposals for handling the inconsistency from their own perspectives. These proposals reflect different concerns and intentions, and it is difficult to reach agreement on choice of proposals. Then the final proposal for handling the inconsistency is often an unsuccessful compromise among these different stakeholders. However, for this kind of inconsistency handling , there are two key problems associated with the identification of acceptable common proposals. One is how to evaluate an individual proposal from the perspective of each distinct stakeholder. That is, each stakeholder involved in the inconsistency needs to express his/her preferences on a set of proposals. It will provide a basis for identifying an acceptable common proposal. Another one is how to identify an acceptable common proposal from the set of these different proposals. Clearly, the latter problem is concerned with the mechanism of choosing the proposals such as negotiation and vote.
To address this, we present a combinatorial vote-based approach to identifying an acceptable common proposal for handling the inconsistency resulting from conflicting intentions of stakeholders in Viewpoints framework [1] in this paper. Combinatorial vote is located within the larger class of group decision making problems. Each one of a set of voters initially expresses his/her preferences on a set of candidates, these preferences are then aggregated so as to identify an acceptable common candidate in an automated way [11] . Informally speaking, for the inconsistency resulting from conflicting intentions of viewpoints (or stakeholders), we transform a set of proposals into a set of candidates with combinatorial structure. Then we consider each distinct viewpoint (or stakeholder) as a voter with different preferences on the set of candidates. Then an acceptable common proposal will be identified according some social vote rules in an automated way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries about inconsistency handling in Viewpoints framework. Section 3 presents the combinatorial vote-based approach to identifying an acceptable common proposal for handling inconsistency. Section 4 gives some comparison and discussion about the vote-based approach. Finally, we conclude this paper in section 5.
Preliminaries

Viewpoints
The Viewpoints approach [1] has been developed to provide a framework in which the different perspectives and their relationships could be represented and analyzed. Viewpoint-oriented approaches to requirements engineering have been used for requirements elicitation [2] , modeling [3] , validation [12] , and elaboration [13] . In the Viewpoints framework, a viewpoint is a description of system-tobe from the perspective of a particular stakeholder, or a group of stakeholders. It reflects the concerns of a particular stakeholder. The requirements specification of the system-to-be comprises a structured collection of loosely coupled, locally managed, distributable viewpoints, with explicit relationships between them to represent their overlaps [14] .
The Viewpoints may allow different viewpoints use different notations and tools to represent their requirements during the requirements stage. However, the first order predicate calculus is appealing for formal representation of requirements statements since most tools and notations for representing requirements could be translated into formulas of the first order predicate calculus [5] . That is, predicate calculus may be considered as a promising tool to represent requirements from multiple sources. Moreover, we focus on the inconsistency handling rather than inconsistency checking in this paper. Then we need not consider reasoning with inconsistency in this paper 1 . For these reasons, we use the predicate calculus to illustrate our approach in this paper.
Let L be a first order language and let be the consequence relation in the predicate calculus. Let α ∈ L be a well-formed formula and ∆ ⊆ L a set of formulas in L. In this paper, we call ∆ a set of requirements statements or a partial requirements specification while each formula α ∈ ∆ represents a requirements statement.
As mentioned earlier, in this paper, we are concerned with the problem of handling inconsistency that involves multiple viewpoints. We would assume that
is the set of distinct viewpoints. Let ∆ i be the set of requirements of viewpoint v i . Then the partial requirements specification is represented by a n tuple
an integrated requirements collection, which could be viewed as a combination of requirements of multiple viewpoints. For example
Inconsistency in Viewpoints
The term of inconsistency has different definitions in requirements engineering [6] . In this paper we will be concerned with the logical contradiction: any situation in which some fact α and its negation ¬α can be simultaneously derived from the same requirements collection [4] . Moreover, we focus on the inconsistency arising from multiple viewpoints. 
If ∆ is inconsistent, then ∆ may be partitioned into two collections. One is the set of requirements statements being free from inconsistency, and another is the set of requirements statements involved in inconsistency. Actions for handling inconsistencies are always concerned with the set of requirements statements involved in inconsistency. Let
Essentially, INC(∆) is the set of inconsistent subsets of ∆; MI(∆) is the set of minimal inconsistent subsets of ∆; CORE(∆) is the union of all minimal subsets of ∆; and FREE(∆) is the set of requirements that don't appear in any minimal inconsistent subset of ∆, that is, it is a set of requirements statements being free from inconsistency. In contrast, CORE(∆) could be considered as a collection of all the requirements statements involved in inconsistency of ∆. It is this set that is of concern in the inconsistency handling. Now we give an example to illustrate these concepts.
Example 1.
Consider the following setting in development of residential area management system, which deals with the maintenance of fixed garages for vehicles. Alice, a manager who is in charge of maintenance, supplies the following demands:
-The damaged garages should be maintained; -An individual free garage, Garage 1 is damaged.
Alice's goal is -Garage 1 should be maintained.
Bob, a manager who is in charge of distribution of garages, gives the following demands:
-Each garage on the expiration of utilization should be routinely maintained; -All the free garages should not be maintained; -Another individual garage, Garage 2 is on the expiration.
Bob's goal is -Garage 2 should be maintained.
Then the requirements of viewpoint v
The requirements of viewpoint v B , denoted ∆ B , is
We can conclude that
Then ∆ is inconsistent. In this case,
As mentioned above, the repair actions should be performed on CORE(∆). Generally, just for the simplicity of reasoning, the requirements set ∆ i contains both preliminary requirements statements and relevant facts. For example, Damaged(Garage 1) ∧ F ree(Garage 1) and Expire(Garage 2) are facts in ∆ A and ∆ B , respectively. These facts are used to model the certain scenario associated with each viewpoint's goal. This paper focuses on how to elect an acceptable common proposal for modifying the preliminary requirements specification , then we will view the facts as being correct and not subject to the modification of preliminary requirements. This will allow us to focus our attention on choice of actions performed for modifying the preliminary requirements. Thus, we are concerned with proposals for modifying a set of problematical preliminary requirements, denoted CORE(∆) P , which is a subset of CORE(∆). In the example above,
Combinatorial vote
Combinatorial vote has been presented by Lang in [11] , where a group of voters (or agents) is supposed to express their preferences and come to a common decision concerning a set of non-independent variables to assign. Of course, the set of candidates X has combinatorial structure [11] . A combinatorial vote problem consists of two steps:
(1) the voters express their preference on a set of candidates within a fixed representation language; (2) one or several optimal candidate(s) is (are) determined automatically, using a fixed vote rule.
A preference profile consists of a preference structure for each of the voters. A relational preference structure consists of a binary relationship ≥ on X . A vote rule V is defined as a function mapping every preference profile P to an elected candidate, or a subset of candidates. Given a preference profile P and a vote rule V , the set of elected candidates is denoted by Select V (P ). Scoring rules consists in translating the preference relation ≥ i of voters into scoring function s i (x), such that the score s i (x) of a candidate x with respect to voter i is a function of its position in the relation ≥ i . The plurality and the veto rules are appropriate for combinatorial vote [11] . In this paper, we adopt the plurality rule as the vote rule to illustrate our approach. Actually, the choice of social vote rules used in the practice should depend on the specific circumstances.
The plurality rule is the scoring rule obtained by taking s i (x) = 1 if and only if x is non-dominated for ≥ i , i.e., iff there is no y such that y > i x. Select plurality (P ) is the set of candidates maximizing the number of voters for whom x is non-dominated.
Identifying An Acceptable Common Proposal of Inconsistency Handling
In this section, we will transform the problem of identifying an appropriate proposal for handling inconsistency into combinatorial vote. It consists of four key steps:
(1) We define a 1-1 mapping from the set of proposals to a set of candidates that has combinatorial structure; (2) We transform the evaluation of proposals from the perspective of an individual viewpoint into a voter's preference representation on the set of candidates; (3) Given a social vote rule, the set of elected candidates is identified automatically. (4) The set of elected candidates is transformed into the set of acceptable common proposals.
Proposals of inconsistency handling
Generally, handling inconsistency in an integrated requirements collection ∆ means that stakeholders or viewpoints involved in the inconsistency are trying to reach an agreement on the modification of CORE(∆) P . Informally, proposal for handling inconsistency should be a series of actions performed to modify CORE(∆) P . For each requirements α ∈ CORE(∆) P , an individual proposal for handling the inconsistency will delete it from CORE(∆) P or retain it.
Now we try to transform the problem of identifying appropriate proposals for inconsistency handling into a problem of combinatorial vote. Let |CORE(∆) P | be the number of requirements in CORE(∆) P . Suppose that |CORE(∆) P | = m and A = {a 1 , · · · , a m } be a set of propositional variables that don't appear in ∆. Then we can define a 1-1 mapping f from CORE(∆) P to A. Further, let Π be a set of possible proposals for handling the inconsistency in CORE(∆) P , then |Π| = 2 m .
Definition 2 (Transformation Mapping). Let
Let Π be the set of possible proposals for handling inconsistency. Transformation mapping t is a 1-1 mapping from Π to X such that for every π ∈ Π,
Essentially, by transformation mapping t, we transform the set of possible proposals into a set of candidates with combinatorial structure. Suppose that v i1 , · · · , v i k involved in the inconsistency of ∆, the the problem of identifying appropriate proposal is transformed into the following problem:
Since X has combinatorial structure, then the latter is a problem of combinatorial vote [11] . Now we give an example to illustrate this transformation.
Example 2. Consider Example 1. again. Alice and Bob are involved in the inconsistency and
Now we define mapping f from CORE(∆) P to {a 1 , a 2 } as follows:
There are 4 possible proposals for handling inconsistency:
to delete all the requirements in CORE(∆) P ; -π 4 : to retain all the requirements in CORE(∆) P .
Then Π = {π 1 , π 2 , π 3 , π 4 } and
Now we transform inconsistency handling problem into a combinatorial vote problem:
-Two voters (stand for Alice and Bob, respectively) to elect a winner in
Voting for a common proposal
As mentioned earlier, voters' preferences on the set of candidates play an important role in combinatorial vote. In this paper, for a particular voter, we focus on the relational preference structure on X . It should be associated with the viewpoint's preference on the set of proposals. Intuitively, the viewpoint's preferences on the set of proposals are always associated with the degree of satisfaction of his/her goal by performing each proposal. For each proposal π i ∈ Π, let π i (∆) denote the modification of ∆ by performing the proposal π i . Let G i j denote the number of formulas of goal G j that can be derived from π i (∆ j ) consistently. Then G i j may be viewed as a measure of the degree of satisfaction of the goal.
Definition 3 (Preference on Π). Let Π be the set of possible proposals. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), a binary relationship with regard to viewpoint
v i on Π, denoted ≥ i ,
is defined as follows:
Note that π l > i π j if and only if π l ≥ i π j and π j ≥ i π l .
Definition 4 (Preference on X ). Let Π be the set of possible proposals. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), ≥ i is a binary relationship with regard to viewpoint
Now we give an example to illustrate the preferences of voters. 
Note that candidates written on a same line are equally preferred.
In this paper, we adopt the plurality rule as the vote rule. As mentioned earlier, the plurality rule is the scoring rule obtained by taking s i (x) = 1 if and only if x ∈X is non-dominated for ≥ i , i.e., iff there is no y such that y > i x. Given preferences profile P , the set of acceptable common candidates, denoted Select plurality (P ), is the set of candidates maximizing the number of voters for whom x is non-dominated. 
The plurality rule is used as the vote rule. Then the scores of candidates are:
Clearly, Select plurality (P ) = {(a 1 , ¬a 2 )}. That is, (a 1 , ¬a 2 ) is the winner in X . Since t −1 ((a 1 , ¬a 2 )) = π 2 , π 2 is the acceptable common proposal for handling the inconsistency in ∆ A ∪∆ B . Therefore, by voting, (∀x)(F ree(x) → ¬M aintain(x)) should be deleted from ∆ B for maintaining consistency.
The combinatorial vote-based approach to identifying the acceptable common proposals presented above may be illustrated as follows:
−→ π i (winner).
Discussion and Comparison
For the combinatorial vote, the computational complexity of the different problems obtained from the choice of a given representation language (propositional logic) and a give vote rule (plurality rule) has been studied by Lang in [11] . However, there are other vote rules such as the veto rule also appropriate for combinatorial vote mentioned in [11] . The veto rule is obtained by letting s i (x) = 1 if and only if there is at least a candidate y such that x > i y. If the veto rule is used as the vote rule in Example 4., then
And Selet veto (P ) = {(a 1 , ¬a 2 )}. The winner is also (a 1 , ¬a 2 ) under the veto rule. Of course, it is possible to get the different winners under different vote rules.
On the other hand, inconsistency handling in requirements engineering is a rather complex issue. Most works focus on the inconsistencies that result from misunderstand customer's demands or incorrect statement of requirements [17, 18, 5] . In contrast, the combinatorial vote-based approach is more appropriate to handling inconsistencies that result from conflictive goals or intentions of stakeholders. This kind of inconsistency handling is always associated with many social activities such as vote and negotiation. It is not just a technical issue. The vote-based approach may be viewed as a first attempt to provide appropriate mechanism for handling inconsistencies result from conflict goals or intentions.
The preferences on the set of possible proposals of each individual viewpoints play an important role in electing the acceptable common proposals in the vote-based approach. In this paper, we just use G l i to evaluate the relative importance of proposal π l from the perspective of viewpoint v i . However, different goals (formulas) in G i may have different relative importance. So the relative importance of each formula of G i that can be derived from π l (∆ i ) should be also taken into consideration in representing preferences on Π of v i . This would be a direction of future work.
Conclusions
We have presented a combinatorial vote-based approach for identifying the acceptable common proposals for handling inconsistency in Viewpoints framework.
Identifying appropriate inconsistency handling actions is still a difficult, but important challenge. The vote-based approach presented in this paper focuses on the inconsistency that results from conflicting intentions of different stakeholders. The main contribution of this paper is to transform identifying appropriate proposals for handling inconsistency into a problem of combinatorial vote. It consists of four key steps:
(1) we define a 1-1 mapping from the set of proposals to a set of candidates that has combinatorial structure; (2) we transform the evaluation of proposals from the perspective of an individual viewpoint into a voter's preference representation on the set of candidates; (3) Given a social vote rule, the set of elected candidates is identified automatically. (4) The set of elected candidates is transformed into the set of acceptable common proposals.
However, inconsistency handling in requirements engineering is a rather complex issue. For the vote-based approach presented in this paper, the choice of social vote rules used in the combinatorial vote and the approaches to evaluating each proposal should be considered further in the future work.
